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This chapter examines the link between corporate governance ideology and 
HR (human resource) practices involved in the important and ongoing issue of 
senior staff salaries. In the spirit of financialization and hyper-individuals, the 
mainstream corporate governance ideology promotes beliefs about competitive pay 
and managerial power. These beliefs shape the design and implementation of HR 
practices by legitimizing the ‘common-sense’ assumption that senior staff members 
should, primarily, be rewarded for meeting corporate goals. However, our discus-
sion critiques the use of this corporate governance ideology for encouraging myopia 
and silence amongst remuneration committee members in response to growing 
inequality. This is exemplified by an inductive analysis of remuneration committee 
minutes taken from British universities (n = 67). Interestingly, this example also 
highlighted a marginalized belief about sacrificial leadership that countered this 
growth under alternative ideology in the spirit of altruism. The chapter recom-
mends the radical proposal that remuneration committees should expand their 
remit beyond only considering senior staff salaries and promote HR practices that 
will embed altruism and equality.
Keywords: HR practices, pay, universities, remuneration committees,  
corporate governance
1. Introduction
Rising senior staff salaries is a contentious and ongoing human resources man-
agement (HRM) issue that received widespread prominence in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and United States of America (USA) after the 2008 financial crisis [1]. It is 
also likely to remerge in response to COVID-19 as many on the workforce may be 
prone to experiencing pay stagnation, zero-hour contracts, redundancies and work 
intensification in response to falling stock values and the economic recession. For 
organizations, being able to legitimize such inequality is particularly important as, 
according to the social contract tradition, socio-economic cooperation is dependent 
upon everyone believing they receive a fair stake of the economy [2]. However, 
legitimizing inequality is becoming increasingly harder as important institutions 
like the UNDP [3] and World Economic Forum [4] are campaigning against it.
Remuneration committees – also known as ‘compensation committees’ in the 
USA context – play a key function in determining senior staff salaries [5]. Past 
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studies focus on their important role in corporate governance, but the conventional 
understanding of how remuneration committees operate has historically focused 
primarily on agency theory and quantitative methods approaches [6]. In tandem, 
HR practices have typically embodied a shareholder-centric ideology rather than 
wider stewardship considerations [7, 8]. While these predilections may coincide 
with the spirit of financialization and hyper-individualism, there have recently 
been calls for HRM to return to its ethical roots – being born out of concern for 
human welfare – and promote more socially responsible and ethical HR practices 
[9]. This chapter aspires to respond to this need by exploring what HR practices 
remuneration committees are using to pay their senior staff and identifying the 
underpinning ideological norms. Equally, this chapter explores what alternative 
ideologies of corporate governance exist and theorizes how HR practices could 
be used to halt rises in senior salaries. Overall, this chapter seeks to answer the 
research question: How can HR practices be used within remuneration committees 
to promote equality?
2. Literature review
2.1 Ideology: the design and implementation of HR practices
The concept of ideology is used to describe a system of beliefs that are widely 
taken-for-granted and are assumed to be common-sense, natural and non-ideological 
by most of society [10]. Particularly for this book chapter, understanding the role 
of ideology is important because it socially conditions semiosis and it has a dialectic 
relationship with social practice. Or in simpler words, ideology represents the shared 
values that shape people in society accept as legitimate, and in turn, shapes how 
people in society behave. Although, ideologies can have different degrees of natural-
ization and some members of society could subscribe to alternative ideologies or draw 
upon multiple ideologies. Only mainstream ideologies, in that everyone shares them, 
become naturalized as background knowledge.
Ideology plays a central role in ordering all social interactions, including creat-
ing, reproducing and changing relations of power, hierarchy and exploitation [11]. 
HR practices that promote rises in senior staff salaries and inequality, like all social 
practices, have traces of ideology implicitly embedded within them. The values of 
the academic designing and producing the HR practice embeds their own ideologi-
cal assumptions. Equally, the values of practitioners implementing and interpreting 
the HR practice also embed their own ideological assumptions.
While it might appear normal to most of society, the field of HRM itself has even 
been proposed as promoting a managerialist ideology and has been used criticized 
for facilitating the intensification of work and the commodification of labour [12]. 
The fundamental assumption underpinning most of HRM is unitarist, which is 
the belief that employee benefit from advancing their employers goals and their 
interests are intertwined [13]. The difference between reality and rhetoric has been 
subject to significant debate [14], nevertheless, within the context of contemporary 
capitalism, HRM is considered background knowledge and a core component of 
any organization.
2.2 Context: financialization and hyper-individualism
The features of contemporary capitalism have been described using multiple 
terms, but two of the most popular are financialization (i.e. translating all soci-
etal and organizational aspects into monetary terms) and hyper-individualism 
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(i.e. a reification of single person interests over the collective), which is the 
context within which many organizations, including British universities, are said 
to operate in. Financialization has numerous definitions but the one particularly 
pertinent to this present chapter is the ascendency of the shareholder value 
orientation representing the ideological driver behind organizational behavior 
[15]. While obviously, not every organization maximizes shareholder value, these 
are believed to be exceptions rather than the rule due to market competition. 
Essentially, organizations that invest their resources in social or environmental 
activities are said to be jeopardizing their market position and risk being takeover 
by financially stronger competitors that only maximize economic returns [16]. 
The role of HR within this context is limited and has been summarized as focus-
ing on cost control, talent management and identifying value-adding employees 
as opposed to influencing corporate governance decisions [17].
Financialization shares many similarities with hyper-individual within contem-
porary capitalism, but the former focuses on organizational behavior, whereas the 
latter focuses on individual behavior. Hyper-individualism believes that everyone 
will maximize their economic self-interest, even at the expense of others, and this 
is the ideological driver behind individual behavior [18]. Within a meritocratic 
organization, competition and markets are believed to be the primary mechanisms 
for deciding recruitment, reward and promotion. Essentially, staff who are more 
capable will receive more of these opportunities, which will eventually allow them 
to become senior and receive higher salaries [19]. The role of HR within this context 
is limited to the alignment of individual economic interests with their employer 
and has been summarized as focusing on reward strategies, talent management and 
high-performance work systems [7] rather than collectivist alternatives [20]. While 
both sets of HR practices have different ideological underpinnings, the former HR 
practices associated with the context of hyper-individualism and financialization 
are more common and also coincide with the mainstream corporate governance 
ideology.
2.3 Mainstream corporate governance ideology
Corporate governance is broadly defined as the system of rules, laws and factors 
that control the operations of a company [21], and as part of this, decisions over 
senior staff salaries are seen to be very important [22]. However, it is rarely framed 
as an HR issue [17] but instead understood through two opposing beliefs about 
competitive pay and managerial power [6]. The former believes that markets and 
optimal pricing contracts are responsible for rises in senior staff pay [23], whereas 
the latter believes that senior staff use their influence to increase their pay by 
extracting rent from their organization [24]. While these beliefs reflect opposite 
propositions, they share the same ideological assumptions. Both are underpinned 
by agency theory, which is the assumption that the separation between ownership 
and management leads to problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection 
[25]. Thereby, the ideological purpose behind corporate governance is to align 
the interests of managers with their shareholders [15] and the legitimacy of rising 
senior staff salaries is dependent on whether it benefits shareholders.
Within modern capitalism, it is often assumed that senior staff may not always 
act in the best interests of shareholders and at given opportunities will pursue their 
self-interest by, for example: shirking their responsibility; ‘empire building’; engag-
ing in suboptimal risk-taking; seeking excessive compensation; and supporting 
nepotism. Accordingly, the normative solution is using the board of directors and 
HR-coordinated remuneration committee to monitor and control the level of pay for 
senior staff by aligning the interests of senior staff members with shareholders [5]. 
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Supporters of competitive pay seek to prove that there a relationship between pay 
and performance which negates the principal-agent dilemma by illustrating that rises 
in senior staff salaries coincide with higher returns for shareholders. Supporters of 
managerial power aim to establish that there is a relationship between pay and power 
which the principal-agent dilemma causes by illustrating that rises in senior staff 
salaries do not coincide with higher returns for shareholders. In terms of empirical 
evidence, there is a vast number of studies validating both beliefs however neither 
approach is deemed to provide a complete explanation [6].
Implicitly within agency theory, corporate governance is about aligning the 
interests of those who manage the organization with those who own the orga-
nization [26]. Although, the dominance of this shareholder perspective is being 
somewhat eroded by the stakeholder perspective [27]. The latter approach suggests 
that corporate governance is about aligning the interests of those who manage the 
corporation with all stakeholders. While this provides an alternative measure of 
performance, ultimately it does not matter whether senior staff are being paid for 
creating shareholder value or stakeholder value, the consequences for pay are the 
same and it is merely a set of different performance metrics. The ideological pur-
pose of the HR-coordinated remuneration committee thus continues to align rises in 
senior staff salaries with rises in performance, regardless of whether the corporate 
goal is to create value for only shareholders or all stakeholders. Worryingly for HRM 
at the senior level, remuneration committees do not need to concern themselves 
with rising senior staff salaries or workforce concerns about growing inequality as 
long as there is increasing performance to legitimize them both.
2.4 HRM at the senior level
Concerns about rising senior salaries and growing inequality are often believed 
to be important because of social responsibility and ethics [28], but mainstream 
corporate governance ideology is not necessarily equipped to encompass morality. 
Equally, the dominant approach to HRM could be criticized for not being equipped 
to understand these same concerns as HR practices often embody the same 
shareholder-centric ideology [29]. While HRM is not usually represented with staff 
membership to senior level committees and board, when it is, the HR director tends 
to act as a strategic business partner [30, 31]. HR within the business partnership 
role limits itself to promoting organizational goals, which has arguably been caus-
ing the profession to lose touch with employees and wider stewardship concerns 
[32]. HRM pursuing organizational goals may lead to a strategic mindset where HR 
practices are only a tool to create shareholder value [33] instead of advocating more 
employee-focused HR practices and improving the welfare of all staff [34].
HRM often accepts, implicitly or explicitly, the mainstream ideology of corpo-
rate governance by focusing on aligning the interests of employees with employers 
as per the unitary perspective [13]. For example, the HR practices of performance-
related pay, talent management and marketization have been uncritically used 
within HRM to legitimize increasing senior staff pay as they correspond with 
increasing levels of performance [7, 8]. These HR practices assume that employees 
are motivated by pay and will maximize their self-interest. These HR practices 
also assume that organizations can use pay as a mechanism to align both of their 
interests and ensure employees maximize their performance. However, none of 
these HR practices are born out of concern for human welfare or seek to promote 
more socially responsible and ethical HR practices that are increasingly demanded 
[9]. Rising senior staff pay and pay inequality will continue under these ideological 
assumptions, which is problematic as, according to the social contract tradition, 
socio-economic cooperation is dependent upon everyone believing they receive a 
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fair stake of the economy [2]. Therefore, this chapter seeks to explore what alterna-
tives ideologies and HR practices exist that could promote equality.
3. Methodology
To provide an inductive example of how corporate governance ideology 
influences the design and implementation of HR practices, a case study about 
across British universities is developed. The data collection was based on partially 
redacted document meeting minutes in remuneration committees (n = 67) and 
items such as registers, agendas, appendices and lists of figures. The number of 
sets of minutes analyzed ranged from one to nine across each university and they 
were taken from different points of time, but the majority of meetings took place 
after 2009. Also, information has been redacted in the minutes to make individuals 
unidentifiable.
The data analysis was based on three analytical steps [35]. The first step was to 
identify all the data fragments that directly or indirectly referred to senior staff pay 
by reading and interpreting the text within the context of their creation. The second 
step was an iterative process of open coding which grouped these data fragments 
into first-order HR practices. Some data fragments referred to multiple HR prac-
tices and these fragments were codable more than once. Data fragments that made 
claims about senior staff pay, but did not communicate directly or indirectly any 
rationale were discarded. The final step employed an iterative coding process which 
aggregated the HR practices into beliefs and ideologies about corporate governance.
4. Findings and discussion
The analysis identified seven different HR practices and these were aggregated 
into three different beliefs about corporate governance (see Table 1.). Two of these 
beliefs – competitive pay and managerial power [6] – coincided with the main-
stream ideology of corporate governance as they sort to align the interests (or pay) 
of senior staff with the interests (or performance) of the organization. The six HR 
practices that it underpinned were common to all remuneration committees and it 
was evident from the analysis that the members considered this to be background 
knowledge within the context of financialization and hyper-individualism [7, 8]. 
Interestingly, there was also a marginalized belief that emerged about sacrificial 
leadership, whereby senior staff conscientiously went against their self-interest by 
giving up their pay and instead used this money to promote the interests of other 
stakeholders and appeared more considered about stewardship.
While beliefs about competitive pay and managerial power were more com-
monly used and naturalized by remuneration committee members, this alternative 
belief about sacrificial leadership merits serious consideration and could provide a 
strong platform to promote equality. This behavior contradicts agency theory [25] 
since senior staff are not motivated by self-interest and there is no need to align it to 
the organization. Equally, this behavior contradicts mainstream corporate gover-
nance [5] since there is no need to pay senior staff to increase their performance. 
Senior staff giving up part of their salary or refusing a pay rise in the spirit of 
altruism has not been previously discussed in the ideology of corporate governance. 
Yet, altruism could be beneficial in helping remuneration committees to overcome 
problems such as myopia and silence [36]. The narrow focus on performance and 
the unwavering acceptance of best practice has arguably led to senior staff salaries 
rising without being sufficiently challenged.
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Admittedly, only one HR practice was identified supporting this alternative 
ideology about corporate governance. However, it is possible that other HR prac-
tices might have been used if remuneration committees could expand their remit. 
For example, training and development, workforce planning, and recruitment and 
selection of senior staff could have helped embed altruism by allowing senior staff 
to be chosen based on their morality rather than solely economic competence. Also, 
this would avoid traditional complaints about senior staff deciding to increase their 
own pay and supporting claims about managerial power [24]. Within the context of 
financialization and hyper-individualism, senior staff would typically exploit this 
system and increase their pay, however, carefully recruiting, promoting and train-
ing senior staff to ensure that they embody the spirit of altruism could be somewhat 
beneficial.
4.1 Competitive pay
It was found that every remuneration committee used HR practices about per-
formance-related pay [37], talent management [38] and marketization [39]. These 
HR practices were also implicitly used to legitimize rises in senior pay under the 
ideology of corporate governance, which was either about maximizing shareholder 





Senior staff are 
motivated by pay and 
their performance is 
dependent on whether 
their self-interest is 
aligned with their 
organization.
Senior staff are 
motivated by pay and 
will advance their self-
interest at the expense of 
their organization given 
the opportunity.
Senior staff are not 
motivated by pay 
and will perform 
to the best of their 
ability, even at the 
expense of their 
self-interest.
HR practices used Performance-related pay 
promotes paying senior 
staff according to how 
they perform for their 
organization.
Talent management 
advocates paying senior 
staff according to how 
difficult they are to 
replace and how much 
value they add to their 
organization.
Marketization focuses 
on paying senior staff 
according to the market 





seek opinions from 
others about senior staff 
salaries.
Appraisal system 
focuses on the rules 
and procedures used 
by the remuneration 
committee to determine 
senior staff salaries.
Compensation costs 
focus on how affordable 
the senior staff salaries 
are to their organization.
Employee 
participation focuses 
on paying senior 






It encourages committee 
members to be myopic 
and act as accomplices 
to rising senior salaries 
in the context of 
financialization and 
hyper-individualism.
It encourages members 
to be silent and act 
as bystanders to 
rising senior salaries 




members to be 
ethical and act as 
opposition to rising 
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value [15] or stakeholder value [27]. While British universities do not have share-
holders as depicted in agency theory [25], they shared the same preoccupation with 
increasing organizational performance by aligning it with the self-interest of senior 
staff. For example, it was explicitly stated that individual performance appraisals 
corresponded with the pay of senior staff and there was a mathematical relationship 
between the two:
‘link between the level of performance assessed in personal reviews to be between 
1 and 5 and a corresponding range of percentage awards between x and y.’ 
(University 1)
While most of the discussion in the minutes appeared to be focused on indi-
vidual performance, it was claimed that it coincided with wider university perfor-
mance metrics. The importance of performance-related pay also coincides with 
agency theory and the belief that pay aligns the interests of the senior staff mem-
bers with their university [25]. The remuneration committee acted upon this belief 
effectively as confirmed during a committee meeting that the targets set for senior 
staff directly contributed towards wider university performance targets:
‘…performance-related pay (PRP) elements linked directly to objective evidence-
based delivery against the University’s testing suite of Key Performance Indicators’ 
(University 3)
Although, pay rises were not just driven by the HR practice of performance-
related pay combined with increased levels of individual performance, but also by 
wanting to retain their senior staff as part of the HR practice of talent management. 
The valued added by senior staff was believed to be high and without offering them 
sufficient reward then it was feared that the most talented would – per their self-
interest – leave their university in search for more money [40]. Consequently, the 
university’s performance would suffer:
“In addition, the view was expressed that the University would not become 
‘Scotland’s leading University’ if it was not able to retain and reward its very best 
staff.” (University 16)
As part of the talent management process, salaries of senior staff in other 
institutions were systematically collected, compared and used to decide what would 
be a suitable reward [41]. It ensured that their senior staff could not be tempted by 
other institutions. This data set was usually prepared by the head of HR or exter-
nal consultants and was referenced in the minutes or attached as an appendix as 
illustrated below:
‘Document REM12/21 which provided information to assist the Remuneration 
Committee in determining the salary for Executive Board members with effect 
from 1 August 2013.’ (University 6)
Universities sought to pay their senior staff the same or more than their compet-
itors – other universities – and there appeared to be a ‘war over senior talent.’ It was 
common for universities to poach senior staff from other institutions and motivate 
them to leave by offering them more money. This competition for talent created a 
ratcheting effect on pay, which was amplified as senior staff also told their current 
employer about these increased offers. Essentially, senior staff were maximizing 
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their self-interest by pitting employers against each other and taking advantage of 
their bargaining power:
‘Salary increases given to X members of XXXX staff, who had received job offers 
from another University. Salaries were increased to retain these individuals in 
XXXXX.’ (University 7)
The final HR practice that coincided with this belief about competitive pay 
was remunerating senior staff according to the market. As with the latter two HR 
practices, it was seen to be in the interest of universities not to be left behind and 
pay their senior staff the same level as their competitors, which was considered to 
be the market rate. If any senior staff member was considered to be paid lower than 
their market worth then the remuneration committee sort to rectify it by giving 
them a pay increase, otherwise it was implied that they might leave [42]:
‘This was in recognition of the scale and scope of his responsibilities and the fact 
that his salary progression since appointment [Name of Vice Chancellor] had 
been suppressed…following years in which salary increases had been minimal.’ 
(University 32)
It was also considered necessary to pay the market rate to attract new senior staff 
members. Across several remuneration committees, it was also noted that British 
universities had to pay a premium to attract senior staff who had the necessary 
talent and could improve their performance. It appeared that all British universities 
were also trying to recruit the same employees, which was pushing up demand and 
their salaries:
‘the role of Faculty Dean for the Business School may require the use of market 
supplements to appoint the right person.’ (University 30)
The problem with beliefs about competitive pay is that it was encouraging 
myopia amongst remuneration committee members. These HR practices were 
focusing only on aligning the self-interest of senior employees with performance, 
which arguably limited the scope of their decision-making and put senior staff in a 
position of temptation to act selfishly, to which most of them succumbed to. Given 
the naturalization of the mainstream corporate governance ideology, none of these 
remuneration committees considered engaging in alternative HR practices, such as, 
workforce planning or training and development and sort to make all their senior 
staff dispensable by increasing the supply of talent and decreasing their market 
worth. In theory, this would allow universities to manage their senior staff like any 
other employee and if one of them received a better offer from a rival university 
then they would be in a position to bid them farewell as they have someone ready 
and just as talented to take their place. In the context of contemporary capitalism, 
this would also provide them with a competitive advantage as their rival would be 
paying more for the same amount of talent and this may discourage poaching senior 
staff from other universities.
While creating more senior talent would increase university HR costs in one 
sense, it may decrease them in another as the university is paying their senior staff 
less money and it would be a transfer of costs rather than additional. Increasing the 
supply of senior staff may also hinder the ratcheting effect by removing the need to 
align their self-interest with performance. Like other employees within the univer-
sity context, it is unfair to give senior staff special privileges and pay them more 
for performing well as, surely, it should be expected that they will act to the best 
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of their ability regardless. Senior staff who do not perform could be transitioned 
into another role or dismissed rather than not rewarded because the university 
has already planned and developed a possible replacement. While expanding the 
remit of remuneration committees beyond just pay so as to include these other HR 
practices is not in the self-interest of senior staff, it would be in the interests of 
British universities to spread their resources and opportunities amongst everyone as 
it would lead to a more skilled workforce and more equality [8]. However, such HR 
practices have not been considered, primarily, because they contradict the domi-
nant assumptions underpinning corporate governance.
4.2 Managerial power
It was also found that every remuneration committee used HR practices related 
to stakeholder consultation [43], appraisal system [44] and compensation costs 
[42] which also justified rises in senior pay. While British universities are not a 
corporation, they appear – in principle but perhaps not in practice – to share the 
same preoccupation with following best practice and limiting the power of senior 
staff to pursue their self-interest at the expense of their organization [24]. For 
example, it was explicitly stated that they engaged in stakeholder consultation over 
senior remuneration to provide an independent perspective [42]. While many of the 
reports were confidential, it is assumed that these best practices were encouraging 
senior salary increases as there were significant increases that year found when 
examining their financial reports:
‘The recommendations took account of best practice within the Russell Group 
and the recent guidance issued by the Russell Group (appendix B of the report).’ 
(University 17)
Nevertheless, not every stakeholder was encouraging pay increases and 
several remuneration committees noted that the UK government, trade unions 
and student bodies had written letters to them. These letters were generally 
requesting universities to show restraint in increasing senior staff pay. While 
these letters were noted and read, they were rarely acted upon by most remu-
neration committees and senior staff salaries continued to rise. Nevertheless, 
considering stakeholder opinions created the appearance that their decision-
making was inclusive:
‘The Committee also noted the letter… which stated that: ‘We are very concerned 
about the substantial upward drift of salaries of some top management. We want 
to see leaders in the sector exercise much greater restraint as part of continuing to 
hold down increases in pay generally.” (University 14)
Remuneration committees also allegedly followed best practice by employing 
bureaucratic HR processes, specifically when undertaking senior staff appraisals. 
None of their pay decisions was made ad hoc and data were systematically collected 
and analyzed to determine whether a salary increase was justified or not through an 
evaluation scheme. No individual could abuse their power to avoid or manipulate 
this process [45]. For example, when someone asked for a pay rise it was said to the 
head of HR:
‘…put the new Secretary/Clerk role through the job evaluation process to establish 
whether or not the additional responsibilities would put the role into the next pay 
band.’ (University 50)
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The appraisal system methodology appeared justified as it was transparent and 
all senior staff were said to be judged against the same standardized procedure. 
Essentially, the remuneration committees were acting upon policies that had already 
been decided and nothing was arbitrary. Self-interest appeared to be managed and 
limited through rules and regulations that ensured objectivity. For example, it was 
said that:
‘Clear guidance…developed for the HR website, clarifying the method of applica-
tion and all potential outcomes regarding salary.’ (University 17)
While the remuneration committee was usually composed of senior staff 
members, to remove the possibility of claims about them pursuing their self-interest 
inappropriately, they would leave the room during their appraisal and this removed 
the opportunity for bias. For example, it was written:
‘To manage potential conflicts of interests, the VC, COO and Clerk to the board 
withdrew from the meeting for those agenda items under which their own remu-
neration was being considered.’ (University 60)
The final HR practice, which was underpinned by beliefs about managerial 
power, was compensation costs. Generally, it was suggested that the cost of senior 
staff remuneration was both relatively small, affordable and non-excessive. Indeed, 
many remuneration committees claimed that the total cost of senior staff remuner-
ation was ‘insignificant’ in comparison to their overall expenditure and its growth 
has been consistent in relation to previous years. For example, it was written that:
‘[Senior staff remuneration] …remained low at 3% of the total cost, the same 
percentage increase as in 2012.’ (University 45)
The remuneration committee minutes also often mentioned a specific budget 
allocated to them, which was approved by an additional and more senior layer of 
bureaucratic scrutiny. This helped them avoid claims about managerial power and 
under most circumstances, they kept within this budget, which gave their decision-
making the perception of following best practice. However, on occasion, it was 
mentioned that they exceeded it and drew on the formerly discussed belief about 
competitive pay to legitimize their managerial behaviors as illustrated below:
‘The Committee is aware that this sum is greater than that originally approved 
by Court, but considers that it is appropriate in the context of the submissions it 
received and the lower than usual budget that had been set.’ (University 53)
Remuneration committees accepted that senior staff needed to be remunerated 
at a competitive level and their budget should be large enough to do so. Equally, 
remuneration committees suggested they needed a sufficiently large budget to 
expand and recruit additional senior staff who are talented. However, it was 
explicitly stated that this needed to be affordable:
‘Members agreed that the recommendation would enable staff to be rewarded to 
their contribution within an affordable framework that provided the University 
with the flexibility to increase staff recruitment.’ (University 49)
The problem with remuneration committees believing that they needed to limit 
managerial power was that it encouraged silence amongst remuneration committee 
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members. These HR practices were focusing only on processes and as long as they 
implemented best-practice then the outcomes of their decision-making could not be 
disputed. The issue is that the underpinning of these best-practices coincided with 
the ideology of corporate governance and beliefs about competitive pay. Essentially, 
committee members could not criticize senior staff for acting selfishly and instead 
normalized this behavior by having supposedly objective policies and procedures 
for deciding how much more money to pay them each year.
In addition to the HR practices noted earlier – workforce planning and train-
ing and development – remuneration committees could expand their remit to 
include recruitment and selection of senior staff. The basis of managerial power is 
the assumption that senior staff are selfish and will maximize their interest at the 
expense of the organization and these best practices limit it. However, the remu-
neration committee should seek to employ selfless senior staff members in the first 
place that will work hard, regardless of whether it is in their self-interest, instead 
for the greater good of their university and higher education. While according to 
the spirit of financialization and hyper-individualism there is no possibility of 
recruiting selfless senior staff members, there was an alternative spirit about altru-
ism found within the minutes and this fits with the below belief about sacrificial 
leadership. It is possible that the ideology of corporate governance is a self-fulling 
prophecy that is encouraging senior staff to be selfish rather than it being a funda-
mental part of human nature [46].
4.3 Sacrificial leadership
Indeed, the final belief diverged from the previous two in that it aimed to 
legitimize pay stagnation instead of pay rises for senior staff. This ideology also 
diverged in that it was not underpinned by corporate governance [6] and did not 
base itself on self-interest and performance. Instead, sacrificial leadership was 
about how senior staff refused a pay rise, despite being legitimate according to the 
other two belief, because of personal ethics about altruism. It refuted the underpin-
ning assumption of agency theory that senior staff pursued only their self-interest 
and it needed to be aligned with their university. For example, a remuneration 
committee acknowledged that the vice-chancellor had met his performance 
metrics but also opted to donate his salary to a student scholarship fund and he was 
applauded for it:
‘The Committee considered the Vice-Chancellor’s achievements and agreed with 
the Chair of Court’s comments that the Vice-Chancellor has continued to lead by 
example in donations to the university.’ (University 17)
The above vice-chancellor was not the only one to donate part of their salary 
away and it was common enough for other remuneration committees to have openly 
discussed this behavior during their meetings. Self-interest appeared not to be the 
driving factor behind the actions of all senior staff as the HR practice of employee 
participation showed:
“It was noted that there had been previous examples where vice-chancellors 
returned a portion of their pay to institutions.” (University 37)
Senior staff were not automatically given a pay rise and under normal circum-
stances, they either had to apply for it or it was integrated into their performance 
appraisal. In the former case, it was an individual choice whether to apply or not 
and there were years when no one submitted anything:
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‘Given that there are no submissions for increases to salary in addition to the usual 
award of nationally agreed pay rates, it may be that the meeting will be relatively 
short.’ (University 12)
In the latter case, some senior staff made the individual choice to write in the 
comment section of their performance appraisal that they did not want to receive a 
pay rise and their employee participation process reduced inequality:
‘The committee was extremely pleased with performance in the last year but 
recognized comment in review and agreed an additional award should not be made 
this year.’ (University 20)
There was also another example when the remuneration committee recom-
mended a large pay rise to their vice-chancellor as there was a disparity following 
beliefs about competitive pay. However, the vice-chancellor refused a pay increase. 
While he finally succumbed to the pressure of the other members and made com-
promise of a small pay rise, it was clear that some vice-chancellors are not moti-
vated by money and this opposes their self-interest:
‘…whilst an increase was agreed, this was lower than that recommended by the 
Committee, and consequently the Vice-Chancellor’s salary remained within the 
lower decile when benchmarked against UCEA data and compared against Scottish 
Vice-Chancellors of similar sized institutions.’ (University 1)
As illustrated above, this new ideology of corporate governance based on altru-
ism did not go unopposed and the HR practice of employee participation was often 
contested. For example, at one university the executive team were supposedly con-
tradicting the concept of market forces by refusing to increase their pay. Nothing 
was done to stop them but it was said that artificially lowing their pay levels may 
make recruitment harder in the future:
“noted the possibility of compression on the pay scale for Executive members at the 
University and concerns regarding future recruitment to the role.” University 18
At another university, where the vice-chancellor had refused any substantial 
pay increase for several years, the head of HR was asked by the committee chair to 
calculate the implications of his sacrifice. It was also claimed that the consequences 
of his actions had prevented other senior staff from receiving pay rises and had 
reduced their motivation. While no reference is made to performance and no 
managerial action was taken at the next meeting, implicitly it was assumed that 
performance would be better if they raised the pay of their vice-chancellor and 
other senior staff:
“The Director (Human Resources) agreed to identify the salary level the Vice-
Chancellor would currently be receiving if he had accepted the average pay awards 
since starting at the University. …a flattening of the Vice-Chancellor’s remuneration 
had a detrimental effect on other senior staff ” (University 67)
Notably, employee participation within the remuneration committee process 
was never used to justify increases in senior pay, likely because it contradicts beliefs 
about managerial power [24]. Nevertheless, there were several instances when 
senior staff members took it upon themselves to oppose their pay rises and acted 
against their self-interest. It is argued this new approach was beneficial for British 
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universities and the spirit of altruism should be encouraged as a new ideology of 
corporate governance. Senior staff who perform to the best of their ability and 
will act against their self-interest for the betterment of their university appears a 
positive force for higher education. Specifically, it would promote more harmonious 
workplace relations by reducing inequality between senior and rank-and-file staff. 
Remuneration committees expanding their remit to consider HR practices about 
training and development, workforce planning and recruitment and selection in 
addition to employee engagement is recommended. Under this enlarge remit it may 
also be beneficial to change the name of this committee as their scope is expanded 
beyond remuneration.
Surprisingly, remuneration committee members disliked this altruistic behav-
ior and instead predominately promoted the mainstream ideology of corporate 
governance, despite it being financially more expensive. While the HR practices 
that underpin are commonly discussed with the academic literature, it is argued 
that they encourage myopia and silence in this setting. The preoccupation across 
remuneration committees with self-interest and performance was legitimizing pay 
increases that were not in the best interest of universities or higher education, only 
senior staff. Members were either bystander by passively normalizing this selfish-
ness behavior with beliefs about managerial power or complicit by actively encour-
aging it with beliefs about competitive pay.
5. Conclusion
Overall, this chapter identities three different beliefs that were found to co-exist 
within remuneration committees and illustrates how each socially determines 
different HR practices. Beliefs about competitive pay focused on performance and 
the alignment of senior staff interests with their organization. Equally, beliefs about 
managerial power focused on implementing best-practice to prevent the misalign-
ment of senior staff interests with their organization. Both of these beliefs coin-
cided with the mainstream ideology of corporate governance and reinforced rises 
in senior staff salaries. In contrast to the former two beliefs, sacrificial leadership 
focused on senior staff ignoring their self-interest and promoting the interests of 
their organization and other stakeholders. It is suggested in this chapter that adopt-
ing this marginalized belief about sacrificial leadership would be more beneficial 
for all organizations.
Indeed, this chapter recommends the radical proposal to embed altruism and 
expand the remit of remuneration committees to include developing and training, 
workforce planning and recruiting and selection. Organizations could thereby have 
a greater proportion of selfless senior staff members. While this might be difficult 
within the context of financialization and hyper-individualism, this marginalized 
belief already exists and there is growing social pressure for organizations to act 
more socially responsible and ethical [9]. Therefore, this chapter serves to point at 
how HR practices can be used within remuneration committees to promote equality 
within this alternative ideology of corporate governance.
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